August 11, 2019
By Colin Talks Crypto

This is my reply to the Tokenika proposal. I will be referencing the points made in that proposal.

Regarding point #1: We don't know if a proxy will, in fact, free B1 of responsibility or not. That is for B1's lawyers to decide. If they decide they cannot safely do it, then it won't be done. Yes, this kind of a proxy could be run without B1 tokens as well.

My second concern, and this is my biggest one, is that a publicly governable proxy of this nature would be gameable by the same whales and exchange BPs who are already manipulating the system with their votes. I think it is possible— probable even— that these same BPs could manage to gain control of this proxy as well for their own purposes. I will elaborate why.

Regarding points #4 & #5: This just means accounts will be split into many smaller accounts, to have more say in who the nominees are. Again, gameable.

Regarding point #6: The countermeasures, such as requiring 50 EOS, is nothing to a whale who will gladly make hundreds of accounts when he holds millions of EOS. The cost will not prohibit whales. It will only prohibit smaller, regular token holders from abusing the system in the same manner as whales will. Gameable.

Regarding point #7: It's easy to hide token sources with mixers, converting tokens on exchanges or using privacy coins. It's not reliable and is easy to overcome. On-train tracking is not realistic nor do I think it will be effective.

Bottom line: Top 21 whale/cartel/exchange BPs will dominate and control such a proxy.

With all of these concerns, I cannot recommend this proposal.

I very much appreciate the thought and effort that went into the creation of this idea. It's ideas like this that will spawn improvements on EOS. We just need to ensure they are effective in achieving the intended end result, and they are not subject to manipulation, otherwise they may ultimately exacerbate the problem.

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